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We argue that the procompetitive e⁄ect of international trade may bring about signif-
icant welfare costs that have not been recognized. We formulate a stylized general equilib-
rium model with a continuum of imperfectly competitive industries to show that, under
plausible conditions, a trade-induced increase in competition can actually amplify monopoly
distortions. This happens because trade, while lowering the average level of market power,
may increase its cross-sectoral dispersion. Using data on US industries, we document a
dramatic increase in the dispersion of market power overtime. We also show evidence that
trade might be responsible for it and provide some quanti￿cations of the induced welfare
cost. Our results suggest that, to avoid some unpleasant e⁄ects of globalization, trade
integration should be accompanied by procompetitive reforms (i.e., deregulation) in the
nontraded sectors.
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1￿What is relevant for the general analysis is not the sum of individual degrees of
monopoly but their deviations￿
A.P. Lerner
1 Introduction
There is a general consensus that exposure to international trade reduces domestic ￿rms￿
market power and that welfare gains are likely to materialize through this procompetitive
e⁄ect (e.g., Helpman and Krugman, 1985, Roberts and Tybout, 1996). There is also a large
literature emphasizing the bene￿cial e⁄ects of product market deregulation aimed at lowering
entry barriers (e.g., Schiantarelli, 2005). Yet, what most studies on procompetitive gains from
trade neglect is that the social cost of market power may not depend on its average level only,
but rather on its dispersion across sectors. The aim of this paper is to study the link between
trade and the dispersion of market power and its e⁄ect on welfare.
The insight that welfare is a negative function of the dispersion of market power is often
overlooked because classical analysis of monopoly distortions is usually conducted in partial
equilibrium. On the contrary, in this paper we build a general equilibrium model in which the
degree of market power can vary across industries and show how its dispersion, independent of
the average level, leads to misallocations. The reason is that the equilibrium allocation depends
on relative prices and when relative prices re￿ ect di⁄erences in market power the economy will
deviate from the social optimum. Our goal is to relate the degree of monopoly power in a sector
to the presence of foreign competition and study how various forms of economic integration
can a⁄ect welfare by changing the dispersion of market power.
When trade lowers markups over marginal costs but increases their dispersion, for instance
because trade a⁄ects some sectors and not others, we derive the somewhat paradoxical result
that an increase in competition may actually amplify monopoly distortions. More generally,
we discuss cases in which the average market power of ￿rms matters too and show that con-
ventional procompetitive gains from trade can be reduced or magni￿ed depending on whether
trade also increases or decreases the dispersion of market power. We also propose policy reme-
dies for the misallocation of resources that international integration may induce. In particular,
our model suggests that when trade makes open sectors more competitive than the rest of
the economy, it is advisable to promote competition in those sectors that remain less exposed
2to trade. That is, integration of international markets may call for deregulation in domestic
markets.
Understanding the welfare e⁄ects of changes in the dispersion of market power due to
foreign competition is important because there are many instances in which trade can a⁄ect
the distribution of markups across industries. This might be the case because there are sectors,
like services, that are naturally less exposed to international competition. A quick glance at the
evidence is broadly consistent with this view: using economy-wide data for the US in 2003, we
￿nd that the average Price-Cost Margin (PCM), a commonly used measure of markups, equals
a meagre 13% in manufacturing and a fat 33% in the business sector services, with a peak of 66%
in the real estate activities. Among service industries, the average PCM is 48% in the electricity
industry, 38% in the ￿nance and insurance industry, 28% in the post and telecommunication
industry and 24% in the transport and storage industry.1 Interestingly, in the renting of
machinery and equipment industry, selling nontraded services, the average PCM equals 41.5%,
whereas in the machinery and equipment industry, producing traded manufacturing goods,
the average PCM is 9.5%. Substantial asymmetries in market power may also arise among
traded commodities, because of sectoral asymmetries in trade policy. Agriculture, for instance,
is notoriously heavily protected and, not surprisingly, has an average PCM much higher than
manufacturing (28% against 13% in the US). Even among freely traded manufacturing goods,
transportation costs vary dramatically, implying that some sectors are more shielded than
others from foreign competition.
How trade has a⁄ected the dispersion of market power overtime is ultimately an empirical
question to which Figure 1 provides a ￿rst answer. The graph shows the evolution of the
standard deviation of PCMs across 450 US manufacturing industries (broken line) and the
average trade openness of the same industries (solid line) over the period 1958-1996.2 It is
immediate to see that, starting from the mid 70s, the dispersion of PCMs shows a relentless
increase. More importantly, the standard deviation of PCMs and the average openness chase
each other closely. Figure 2 reinforces this impression by plotting the same two series after
removing a liner trend. The co-movements between the two de-trended measures are evident,
with a simple correlation of 0.4. A simple OLS regression of the standard deviation of PCMs
1Data are from the OECD STAN database.
2Price-cost margins have been computed from the Bartelsman and Gray database, while openness of US
industries is taken from the NBER Trade Database by Feenstra. See section 3 for more details about the data
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Figure 1: Openness and the Dispersion of PCMs
on the openness ratio yields a coe¢ cient of 0.103 (0.007) with an R-squared of 0.81. The
coe¢ cient becomes 0.091 (0.019) after controlling for a time trend. Thus, a ￿rst look at the
data suggests that the dispersion of price-cost margins has increased dramatically, starting in
the mid-70s, and that trade may be partly responsible for this phenomenon. We take these
novel stylized facts as a motivation for our analysis. Plausible quanti￿cations of our model
will suggest that the welfare costs of changes in the dispersion of market power may not be
negligible, while the last section of the paper will con￿rm the positive relationship between
trade and markup dispersion by looking at more detailed and systematic evidence.
This paper is related to the literature studying the welfare e⁄ects of trade in models with
imperfect competition. The fact that, in the presence of distortions, trade might be welfare
reducing is an application of second-best theory and it is not per se so surprising. A notable
example seemingly related to ours is the paper by Brander and Krugman (1983), showing
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Figure 2: Openness and the Dispersion of PCMs (Detrended Series)
goods and compete in quantities. Yet, the intuition for their result relies on the fact that
trade is intrinsically wasteful in their model, while in our paper trade does not impose any
additional cost. More than being just an application of second-best theory, this paper is to our
knowledge the ￿rst to emphasize the general insight that trade can a⁄ect welfare by changing
the cross-sectoral dispersion of market power. A noteworthy corollary of our results is that it
may rationalize the often heard concern that trade may be detrimental in countries (especially
the less developed ones) where domestic markets are not competitive enough. The reason
is not that domestic ￿rms are unable to survive against foreigners (as emphasized by the
infant-industry theory), but rather that international competition may ine¢ ciently increase
asymmetries across sectors in the economy.3
3Using data from the OECD STAN database for the year 2002, we ￿nd a strong negative association between
per capita income and asymmetries in markups between services and manufacturing among OECD countries. In
particular, the di⁄erence between average PCMs in services and manufacturing is largest in Mexico and Greece
(more than 35 percentage points) and smallest in Luxembourg (less than 15 percentage points).
5This paper is also related to the relatively small literature on the cost of monopoly in
general equilibrium. Some papers have recognized that symmetry may neutralize monopoly
distortions. These include the classical article by Lerner (1934), the book by Samuleson (1947)
and more recent contributions such as Neary (2003), Koeniger and Licandro (2006) and Bilbiie,
Ghironi and Melitz (2006). Yet, no paper takes the next step of studying the determinants
of markup dispersion and its induced welfare cost. Perhaps surprisingly, the importance of
markup dispersion is usually overlooked also in the large body of works studying competition
policy.
Finally, this paper contributes to the growing literature on deregulation of markets (i.e.,
policies aimed at promoting competition and ￿rms￿entry), such as Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2003).4 Most of the works in this area focus on entry regulations in closed economy or
identify trade liberalization as a free market policy. On the contrary, this paper suggests that
international trade and entry regulations in domestic markets should be studied together. In
particular, it shows that the process of globalization, by increasing the wedge between market
power in local and international markets, may reinforce the case for deregulation in sectors,
such as services, that remain less exposed to foreign competition.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 builds a stylized model to
make our theoretical point: that trade may have perverse e⁄ects when it alters the dispersion
of market power. The model is then used to show that the welfare costs associated to the
increase in the cross-sectional dispersion of markups observed in the US economy may not
be negligible. Section 3 shows evidence that trade may be responsible for this phenomenon.
Section 4 concludes.
2 International Trade, Competition and Welfare
We build a simple model of a world economy populated by N 2 N+ identical countries. There
is a continuum [0;1] of industries, each composed of varieties of di⁄erentiated goods. Coun-
tries are specialized in di⁄erent varieties and may trade with each other. Market integration is
however imperfect in that trade may not be allowed in all industries. To introduce imperfect
competition and rents in the simplest way, we assume that there is a monopolistic ￿rm per
country and sector and that entry is restricted. Firms in di⁄erent industries are exposed to
4See Schiantarelli (2005) for an extensive survey.
6di⁄erent degrees of competition depending on the possibility to trade their products inter-
nationally. In particular, ￿rms producing nontraded goods only face competition from other
sectors in the economy, whereas ￿rms in traded sectors must also compete with foreign ￿rms
producing similar varieties within the same sector. We use this model to explore how the
process of international integration, described as an increase in the number of traded sectors
and/or trading partners, can a⁄ect the pricing decision of ￿rms and welfare.
2.0.1 The Basic Set-Up
In what follows, we use the letters i;j 2 [0;1] to indicate sectors and the letters n;m 2 f1;:::;Ng
to indicate varieties within a sector. Given that each country produces a single variety in every
sector, N is also the number of countries. Preferences of the representative agent in any country







; ￿ 2 (0;1);
Z 1
0
￿ (i)di = 1; (1)
where C (i) is the sub-utility derived from consumption of di⁄erentiated varieties produced
in sector i 2 [0;1], 1=(1 ￿ ￿) is the elasticity of substitution between sectors and ￿ (i) is the












where P (i) (P (j)) is the cost of one unit of the consumption basket C (i) (C (j)). Demand
















is the minimum cost of one unit of U (taken as the numeraire) and E is total expenditure.
Before de￿ning the basket C (i), it proves useful to describe how trade takes place in the
model. We assume that in some sectors goods can be freely traded, while in others trade
costs are prohibitive. Accordingly, the unit measure of sectors is partitioned into two subsets
7of traded and nontraded sectors, ordered such that sectors with an index i ￿ ￿ 2 [0;1] are
subject to negligible trade costs while the others, with an index i > ￿, face prohibitive trade
costs. We consider two complementary aspects of international integration: (1) an increase in
the range ￿ of traded sectors and (2) an increase in the number N of trading partners. We
believe that both aspects capture important trends in the world economy.5
We are now ready to de￿ne C (i). Preferences for sector i ￿ s varieties, produced in N
di⁄erent countries, are represented by another CES sub-utility function:









; 1 ￿ ￿ > ￿; ￿ ￿ 0; (5)
where c(i;n) is consumption of the variety produced by country n in sector i and 1=(1 ￿ ￿) > 1
is the elasticity of substitution between varieties produced in di⁄erent countries. Note that, in
nontraded sectors, (5) reduces to c(i;n) where n is the domestically produced variety.
Equation (5) is a generalization, introduced by Benassy (1998), of well known Dixit-Stiglitz
preferences. Its special feature is that the factor N￿+1￿1=￿ allows to disentangle the elasticity
of substitution between varieties from the preference for variety. From (5), greater variety is
associated with higher utility whenever ￿ > 0. To see this, suppose that c(i;n) = c so that
the total quantity consumed is cN = C. Then, the sub-utility derived in the typical country
from consumption in sector i will be N￿C, which, holding constant total consumption C, is
increasing in N whenever ￿ > 0. The standard Dixit-Stiglitz preferences are a special case of
(5) for ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)=￿. There are two main reasons why we choose the Benassy formulation.
First, in our model the degree of competition in international markets will depend on
the elasticity of substitution, 1=(1 ￿ ￿): a high elasticity limits the ability of ￿rms to charge
high markups over marginal costs, as an increase in prices would translate into a large drop in
demand. However, in studying the welfare e⁄ects of international trade, we do not want to mix
the e⁄ect through competition in world markets, which is our focus, with that through the value
of product diversity. Thus, we want the elasticity of demand to be potentially independent
from the preference for variety. To preserve the highest clarity, throughout part of the paper
we will shut down completely the preference for variety by assuming ￿ = 0, thereby isolating
5For example, there is growing evidence that international trade has increased mostly along the extensive
margin (we trade now goods that we did not trade before), while the number of countries that are members of
the WTO has increased dramatically during the past decades.
8the procompetitive e⁄ect of trade. This is the same route taken by Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2003) in their related work on product and labor market competition. Nevertheless, we will
also discuss the important case when ￿ > 0.
Second, we want a model in which competition is, in principle, desirable. When competition
is parametrized by ￿, this need not be the case in a standard Dixit-Stiglitz framework. The
reason is that, when ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)=￿, high competition means a low preference for variety ￿
which translates into a lower utility for a given N > 1. Having ￿ independent from ￿ gives
competition the best chance to be welfare improving.6
Finally, it is important to understand the natural assumption ￿ < ￿. It means that goods
within the same sectors are closer substitute than goods produced in di⁄erent sectors. Given
that varieties belonging to the same sector are produced by di⁄erent countries, the restriction
￿ < ￿ will imply that competition in international markets is sti⁄er than in domestic markets
and will deliver the procompetitive e⁄ect of trade: that exposure to international trade and
larger world markets reduce the monopoly power of ￿rms. With ￿ = 0, this will be the only
e⁄ect of trade.
In any traded sector (i ￿ ￿), maximization of (5) subject to a budget constraint yields









where p(i;n) (p(i;m)) is the price of the variety produced by country n (m) in sector i.
Cost-minimization also yields the minimum price of one unit of the consumption basket C (i):

















6Yet, we want to reassure the reader that our main results would hold in a Dixit-Stiglitz world too.
92.0.2 Firms and Market Power
Each variety is produced by a single monopolist and entry is restricted. The absence of free
entry may result from the fact that conditions in each industry are such that when a second
￿rm enters pro￿ts would drop below zero (perhaps due to the presence of ￿xed costs) or that
there are sunk costs associated with entry and a ￿xed number of ￿rms (one per sector in
every country, for simplicity) have already paid it. Restricted entry also captures the presence
of government regulations (e.g., licences) and re￿ ects our desire to study the e⁄ect of trade
when ￿rms make pure pro￿ts. Although free entry might be a reasonable assumption in some
industries, we believe that rents are fairly common so that our case is equally relevant. Later
in the paper, we will see how ￿xed costs at ￿rm level and free entry can modify our results.
Pure pro￿ts are rebated to consumers, though the exact form of redistribution is irrelevant in
our representative agent economy.
Monopolistic ￿rms charge a price that is a constant markup over the marginal cost, where
the latter is for simplicity the wage w (identical across countries in a symmetric world). For
convenience, we de￿ne ￿(i) as the inverse of the markup prevailing in sector i. The optimal
markup is the usual function of the relevant price elasticity of demand ￿: ￿(i) = (1 ￿ 1=￿)
￿1.































where symmetry across varieties (p(i;n) = p(i;m)) has been used. Note that the perceived
demand elasticity is a linear combination of the elasticity of substitution between varieties,
1=(1 ￿ ￿), and sectors, 1=(1 ￿ ￿). An increase in N shifts the weight in favor of the ￿rst term,
which is the larger one. Thus, the perceived demand elasticity is a positive function of the
number of competing ￿rms N in a given sector.7 This immediately delivers the procompetitive
7This happens because each ￿rm￿ s impact on the industry price index P (i) is proportional to 1=N. When
there is a continuum of ￿rms, instead, each of them has zero measure and therefore has no impact on the price
index. This is also the reason why each ￿rm takes the overall price index Q = 1 as given.
10e⁄ect of trade. In a closed sector, where N = 1, the perceived demand elasticity is 1=(1 ￿ ￿),
as a ￿rm producing nontraded goods only competes against ￿rms in other sectors. In open
sectors, the perceived demand elasticity is higher, because ￿rms also compete against foreign
varieties that are closer substitutes; moreover, ￿ increases with the number of trading countries
N and converges to 1=(1 ￿ ￿) as N approaches in￿nity.8
To summarize, the pricing behavior is as follows:







￿ < ￿(i) < ￿ for i 2 [0;￿]
￿(i) = ￿ for i 2 (￿;1]
: (11)
Note that ￿(i) 2 (0;1) parametrizes the degree of competition. As ￿(i) ! 0 the monopolist is
facing a demand with a unit price elasticity and would want to sell an in￿nitesimal quantity at
an in￿nite price. In the limit ￿(i) ! 1 the elasticity of demand is in￿nite so that ￿rms cannot
raise the price above marginal cost, or else demand would drop to zero. From (11) it follows
that markups and prices are lower in traded sectors.
Finally, we de￿ne by x the price of any nontraded variety i 2 (￿;1] relative to that of any












Goods market clearing, together with symmetry across countries, allows us to solve for con-





N￿L(i)=L for i 2 [0;￿]
L(i)=L for i 2 (￿;1]
; (12)
where L(i) is employment in sector i and L is the total labor supply of any country. Equations
(12) show that domestic consumption equals 1=N of world output of traded sectors, while it
8In this model, trade cannot lead to perfect competition, unless ￿ = 1. In other models, instead, an increase
in N will eventually make demand in￿nitely elastic. This is the case, for example, in the Hotelling model of
competition around the circle. Competition in quantities between ￿rms producing homogeneous goods would
deliver the same result. For more details about these models, see for example Epifani and Gancia (2006). The
translog demand function proposed by Feenstra (2003) also has the property that ￿ is a positive function of N.
11equals domestic production in nontraded industries. Finally, allocation of labor across sectors
can be solved using (12), (11) and (7) into (2). Comparing employment in any sector j 2 [0;￿]









That is, sectors with a lower markup (high ￿) and facing stronger demand (high ￿) attract
more workers. Demand for traded goods is also stronger the higher the gains from product
variety, N￿￿=(1￿￿). Finally, we assume for now that labor supply is inelastic and impose labor
market clearing: Z 1
0
L(i)di = L: (14)
2.1 Procompetitive Losses from Trade
We are now ready to discuss how trade a⁄ects welfare. To gain intuition, we start with the
simplest case of symmetric preferences, ￿ (j) = 1 8j 2 [0;1], and no preference for variety, ￿ =
0, so that trade has no e⁄ects other than through changes in ￿rms￿market power. Equations







￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(x)
1=(￿￿1)
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1=(1￿￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)
i￿1
for i 2 (￿;1]
: (15)
Note that traded sectors attract more workers for they are more competitive and thus pay a
higher share of revenues in wages. Substituting (15) and (12) into (1) we obtain utility of the
representative agent as a function of ￿ and x:
U (￿;x) =
￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿x￿=(1￿￿)￿1=￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿x1=(1￿￿) : (16)
Equation (16) is our measure of welfare. We start by noting that in a fully competitive, ￿rst-
best world we have x = 1 and U (￿;x) = 1. The same utility level is attained both in the case
of autarky (￿ = 0) and when trade is free in all sectors (￿ = 1). However, the opening of trade
in some sectors starting from autarky necessarily lowers welfare, while it is welfare increasing
only after ￿ has reached a critical point. To see this, we derive equation (16) with respect to













Figure 3: Trade and Welfare
































Proof. See the Appendix
Thus, as depicted in Figure 3 (solid line), welfare is a U-shaped function of ￿ and converges
to the autarky level only once all sectors have become open. In other words, an equilibrium
with trade is (weakly) Pareto inferior to autarky: U (￿;x) ￿ U (0;x).
What happens as international integration increases the number of trading partners N?
From (10), @￿=@N > 0, so that an increase in N makes demand for traded varieties more
elastic and forces ￿rms in open sectors to lower their markups. The markup in sectors closed
to trade remains una⁄ected, so that an increase in N raises the relative price of nontraded









1 ￿ ￿ + ￿x￿=(1￿￿)￿1=￿￿1
(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿x1=(1￿￿)￿2 < 0; 8￿ 2 (0;1):
13The inequality follows as all factors are positive, except for (1 ￿ x).
Thus, the procompetitive e⁄ect of an increase in the number of trading countries brings
welfare losses. The intuition behind this rather dismal view of the e⁄ects of trade integration
is simple. In this model, the only distortion is noncompetitive pricing. Yet, markup pricing
distorts decisions only to the extent that the degree of market power varies across goods. For
￿ = 0 or ￿ = 1, the markup is the same for all products, meaning that relative prices re￿ ect
relative marginal costs and the allocation of resources dictated by relative prices is the optimal
one.9 Trade breaks this symmetry by lowering markups in some sectors but not in others.
This distorts the allocation of labor: the relative price of traded goods falls and the resulting
increase in demand is met by hiring more workers. Thus, despite the fact that preferences
and marginal costs are identical across goods, the economy experiences underproduction of the
more expensive nontraded goods.10
What can be done to counteract this negative e⁄ect of market integration? We have seen
that the ￿rst best solution is attained when x = 1. Thus, if trade lowers markups in some
sectors, competition policy might be used to match the change in market power in nontraded
sectors too.11 If competition policy cannot be used, the ￿rst best solution can still be achieved
by giving an appropriate subsidy to sectors producing nontraded goods.
Finally, it is shown in the Appendix that the potential loss from trade is increasing in ￿.
The e⁄ect of substitutability across sectors, captured by ￿, on the monopoly distortion induced
by asymmetric markups is not an obvious one. On the one hand, a high substitutability means
that the cost of overproduction in traded sectors is small: indeed, this cost goes to zero as
goods become perfect substitutes. On the other hand, equation (15) shows that, for a given x,
a high substitutability magni￿es the misallocation of labor towards traded sectors. It turns out
that the latter e⁄ects dominates if ￿ < 1=x, as we assumed, so that perhaps counter-intuitively
a lower curvature in the utility function leads to a higher cost of markup dispersion.
What happens when trade also brings gains by increasing product variety? It is easy to
9Markup pricing also implies that wages are too low, but this does not distort any decision as long as labor
supply is inelastic.
10A real world example might be illustrative. Assume that producers of mobile phones are more competitive
than providers of telecommunication services, because the former are more exposed than the latter to foreign
competition. Then, our paper suggests that the price of mobile phones is too low relative to the price of
telecommunication services, and hence that consumers buy too many mobile phones, but use them too little,
with respect to the social optimum.
11For example, deregulation may lower the costs for potential competitors, thereby forcing the domestic
monopolist to charge a lower markup to prevent entry.









Figure 4: Trade and Welfare with ￿ ￿ 0
show that, when ￿ > 0, utility of the representative agent becomes:
U (￿;x;￿;N) =
h
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿ (xN￿)
￿=(1￿￿)
i1=￿
1 ￿ ￿ + ￿ (xN￿￿)
1=(1￿￿) :
Figure 4 depicts welfare as a function of ￿ for the previous case ￿ = 0 (solid line) and the new
case ￿ > 0 (broken line). In the latter, an equilibrium with some trade might still be Pareto
inferior to autarky when ￿ is low, for the gains from small volumes of trade might be too low
to dominate the price distortion. However, when ￿ is large enough, the gains from variety will
eventually dominate the (falling) cost of misallocations. With gains from trade of any sort,
the equilibrium with full integration (￿ = 1) must necessarily dominate autarky.
Note also that the likelihood that trade may be harmful increases with x and that positive
gains from trade will surely materialize if an economy is perfectly competitive. In other words,
the potential for welfare losses is higher when domestic markets are not competitive enough
and trade brings large asymmetries between sectors selling in world markets and the rest of
the economy. These considerations may be particularly relevant for less developed countries,
suggesting that in some cases promoting competition may be a pre-requisite to make sure to
reap positive gains from trade.
152.2 Market Power and Welfare
The case we discussed in the previous section is admittedly special and it should be understood
that some of the provocative results we derived depend on arbitrary assumptions, like having a
uniform markup in autarky. Yet, the model delivers two important and fairly general messages:
that asymmetries in market power may lower allocative e¢ ciency and that trade can play an
important role in shaping them. The remaining of the paper will be devoted to showing that
such asymmetries in markups are not inconsequential for welfare and that trade seems to be an
important driving force behind them. To this purpose, we now use our model to derive a more
general formula to quantify the welfare loss due to the monopolistic distortion when markups
and demand conditions are allowed to vary across sectors. This will enable us to show how the
monopolistic distortion depends on a precise measure of markup dispersion and to quantify its
social cost.12 We will then discuss some conditions under which the average markup matters
too, such as when there is free entry or the labor supply is elastic.
We start by relaxing the restriction that ￿ (i) be equal to one in all sectors. We also allow
￿(i) to vary freely across sectors. This will be the case if ￿ and domestic entry regulations
can vary across goods. For the purpose of this section, we are not interested in quantifying
overall gains from trade so that we can safely maintain the assumption ￿ = 0. Next, we solve








Using (17) together with the goods market clearing condition C (i) = L(i)=L into (1) we ￿nd











From (18) it is easy to verify that when ￿(i) is constant across sectors (no dispersion in market
power), then utility is independent of ￿(i). Likewise, utility is homogeneous of degree zero in
12Lerner (1934) conjectured: ￿the standard deviation (...) may perhaps be used some day to give an estimate
of the divergence of society from the social optimum of production relative to a given distribution of income.￿
We qualify and implement his suggestion, by deriving the right measure of markup dispersion and quantifying
its social cost.
16average markup: multiplying ￿(i) by any given constant leaves welfare una⁄ected. Welfare is
instead a complex function of the dispersion of markups. To see this, rewrite (18) as follows:
U￿ =
E(b ￿￿)E(b ￿) + cov(b ￿;b ￿￿)
[E(b ￿)E(b ￿) + cov(b ￿;b ￿)]
￿ ; (19)
where b ￿ = ￿ (i)
1=(1￿￿) and b ￿ = ￿(i)
1=(1￿￿). Then, assuming for simplicity that b ￿ and b ￿ are
independently distributed and given the concavity of the function b ￿￿, equation (19) shows
that a mean preserving spread of the distribution of b ￿ lowers the numerator while leaving the
denominator una⁄ected. Thus, more dispersion from the mean leads to lower welfare.
More generally, from equation (19) it is di¢ cult to assess the precise impact of a particular
change in the cross-section of markups. However, the formula can easily be used to quantify the
welfare cost of the increase in markup dispersion across US industries documented in Figure 1
for the period 1968-1996. We start by evaluating equation (18) in the simplest case in which
goods are equally weighted in utility, i.e., for ￿(i) = 1 8i 2 [0;1]. Computing utility requires
choosing a value for the elasticity of substitution among manufacturing goods, 1=(1 ￿ ￿).
Available estimates vary widely across studies, but most of them are in the range (2;10). This
implies a value of ￿ between 0:5 and 0:9, that we take as benchmarks. As a proxy for markups,
we use again sectoral price-cost margins, with PCM(i) = 1￿￿(i).13 For ￿ = 0:5, the formula
yields a fall in utility (dU=U) below 1:5%, while the cost grows to more than 3% when a less
prudential value ￿ = 0:9 is used. These costs can be larger when the ￿ (i)s are allowed to vary.
In particular, the weights in utility associated to di⁄erent goods can be calibrated using data










where ￿(i) is the expenditure share of good i and is calculated as the value of an industry￿ s
production plus net imports, divided by the total expenditure on industrial goods. Note that,
calibrated in this way, the ￿ (i)s also account for any asymmetry in costs. For ￿ = 0:5, the
formula gives pretty much the same loss of 1:5%. Yet, the interesting novelty is that with
a high elasticity of substitution (￿ = 0:9), the welfare cost turns into an almost 7% drop in
utility over the 37 years of analysis.
13See Section 3 for more details on how price cost margins are computed.
17Finally, equation (18) has the intuitive implication that competition policy (including trade
liberalization) should target large sectors with above average markups. This can be seen by
taking the derivative of (18) with respect to our measure of competition in a sector, b ￿(i):
@U
@b ￿(i)
= b ￿ (i)
hR 1










0 b ￿ (i)b ￿(i)
￿ di
R 1
0 b ￿ (i)b ￿(i)di
#
:
This formula shows that an increase in the degree of competition in sector i increases (decreases)
welfare whenever competition in that sector, ￿(i), is below (above) a given average ￿￿ ￿
R 1
0 b ￿ (i)b ￿(i)
￿ di=
R 1
0 b ￿ (i)b ￿(i)di. Moreover, the e⁄ect is stronger the bigger the size b ￿ (i) of the
sector. While intuitive, considerations of these sorts are usually neglected in the debates about
the e⁄ects of liberalization. They also suggest that further liberalizations in sectors where
competition is already strong may be much less bene￿cial than expected.
2.2.1 Free Entry
So far, each ￿rm is making positive pro￿ts and barriers to entry prevent potential competitors
from challenging incumbent ￿rms and sharing the rents. Without those barriers, entry will
take place until pure pro￿ts are driven to zero. We now allow for this possibility in some
industries. For the current purpose, we need not specify how competition takes place between
producers of the same variety and how the equilibrium markup is determined. All we require
is that there is a ￿xed cost of production and that, given the industry markup, the number
of ￿rms adjusts to guarantee that each of them breaks even. In this way, in equilibrium, all
operating pro￿ts are used to cover the ￿xed cost.
For simplicity, we assume that the ￿xed cost is in terms of a bundle of goods with the same
composition as ￿nal consumption (1). Then, to ￿nd utility of the representative agent, we can
















I (i)￿ (i)di; (20)
where ￿ (i) = c(i)[p(i) ￿ w] is the sum of all operating pro￿ts in sector i and I (i) is an
indicator function taking value one if there is free entry in sector i and zero otherwise. Given
18that a fraction 1 ￿ ￿(i) of revenue c(i)p(i) goes into pro￿ts (see equation 11), an increase in
competition, ￿(i), has now a direct positive welfare e⁄ect in industries with free entry. The
reason is that a fall in operating pro￿ts means that some ￿rms must exit and less resources
are wasted in ￿xed costs. This is the ￿rationalizing e⁄ect￿of competition (see, for example,
Helpman and Krugman, 1985), originating from a combination of free entry and ￿xed costs in
models with variable markups. Although free entry introduces an additional (positive) e⁄ect of
competition, it leaves the ￿rst term in (20), and thus our computations of the costs of markup
dispersion, una⁄ected.
2.2.2 Endogenous Labor Supply
We brie￿ y mention another reason why welfare can be decreasing in the average level of market
power. In this model, wages are compressed by pro￿ts and are thus too low compared to
the competitive equilibrium. When labor supply is elastic, this will distort the work-leisure
decision. The strength of this distortion will depend upon the elasticity of labor supply. To
see this, we normalize the number of workers in any country to one and introduce disutility
from labor:









; L is now hours worked by the representative agent, ￿ ￿ 0 is the
elasticity of labor supply to wages and A is a positive parameter. For simplicity, we have also
set ￿ (i) = 1, 8i 2 [0;1]. Recalling that the price of the consumption basket C is Q = 1, the
budget constrain of the representative agent is C = wL + ￿, where ￿ is average pro￿t. The






If ￿ = 0; then labor is inelastic to wages and we are back to the previous case. When ￿ > 0; L







< MPL = 1; (22)
19where the latter equality follows from the fact that, with ￿ = 0, labor productivity is one.
That is, workers are not paid the full marginal product of labor (MPL), because part of it
goes into pro￿ts. In this case, the welfare costs of market power can be decomposed into three
parts: (1) as before, for a given L, the dispersion of market power lowers C; (2) the concavity
of (22) implies that the dispersion of ￿(i) also reduces w and thus L below optimum. That is,
the dispersion of market power also distorts labor supply; (3) given that ￿(i) is less that one,
wages are below the marginal product of labor and this lowers L even further. A fall in the
dispersion of market power reduces distortions (1) and (2), while an increase in the average
level of competition lowers distortion (3).
3 Empirical Evidence
In this section we provide more evidence on the relationship between international trade and
the dispersion of market power. As in the Introduction, we use the openness ratio as a proxy for
trade exposure and price-cost margins (PCMs) as a proxy for market power, in this following
a vast empirical literature (see, e.g., Roberts and Tybout, 1996; Tybout, 2003, Aghion et al.,
2005).14 Due to data availability, we limit our analysis to the US manufacturing industries.15
In particular, we draw trade data from the NBER Trade Database by Feenstra and industry
data from the NBER Productivity Database by Bartelsman and Gray. To our knowledge, the
latter is the most comprehensive and highest quality database on industry-level inputs and
outputs, covering roughly 450 manufacturing (4-digit SIC) industries for the period between
1958 and 1996.
We compute the openness variable as the ratio of imports plus exports divided by the value
of shipments. Price-cost margins are instead computed as the value of shipments (adjusted for
inventory change) less the cost of labor, capital, materials and energy, divided by the value of
14An important advantage of PCMs is that they can vary both across industries and overtime. An alternative
approach would be to estimate markups from a structural regression a l￿ Hall (1988). One problem with this
approach is that, to estimate markups across industries or over time, either the time or industry dimension is
to be sacri￿ced, implying that markups have to be assumed constant over time or across industries.
15We would ideally want to study the dispersion of market power economy-wide. Unfortunately, however,
economy-wide data on industry sales and costs are generally available only at a high level of aggregation, thereby
hiding much of the cross-industry dispersion of PCMs. Note, however, that focusing on the US manufacturing
sector should provide a lower bound for the e⁄ects we aim to quantify. In fact, international trade may raise
the dispersion of market power also by increasing asymmetries in markups between manufacturing (producing
traded goods) and services (most of which are nontraded).
20shipments.16 Capital expenditures are computed as (rt + ￿)Kit￿1, where Kit￿1 is the capital
stock, rt is the real interest rate and ￿ is the depreciation rate. Data on US real interest rates
come from the World Bank-World Development Indicators.17 For the depreciation rate, ￿, we
choose a value of 7%, implying that capital expenditures equal, on average, roughly 10 percent
of the capital stock.18 As a robustness check we also try, however, with a simpler measure of
PCMs where we do not net out capital expenditures.
Figures 1 and 2 in the Introduction suggest a positive association between openness and
the dispersion of price-cost margins in US industries. We now want to explore the robustness
of this stylized fact and the causal relationship between the two variables. As a ￿rst step, we
need an empirical strategy that allows us to exploit the cross-sectional and temporal variation
in the NBER datasets. To this purpose, we construct the following industry-level proxy for the
dispersion of market power: for each 3-digit SIC industry, we compute the standard deviation
of PCMs among the 4-digit industries belonging to it. Next, we run Fixed-E⁄ects within
regressions in order to estimate the impact of a rise in the openness of 3-digit industries on
the dispersion of market power within them.
What kind of results shall we expect from such an exercise? In principle, trade may
increase the dispersion of PCM in some sectors and decrease it in others. In fact, our stylized
model shows that trade may increase markup dispersion up to a point and then lower it.
Yet, considering the evidence reported in Figures 1 and 2 plus the fact that the volume of
trade is still relatively small for the typical US manufacturing sector, we may expect trade to
increase dispersion even within 3-digit industries. As a preliminary check, Figure 3 con￿rms
this guess. It reports that the average dispersion of PCMs within 3-digit industries (left scale)
has increased together with the average openness of 3-digit industries (right scale) over the
period of analysis. Thus, the stylized fact illustrated in the Introduction holds also within
industries. Before moving to the more detailed analysis of the data, we want to stress the fact
that the empirical exercises performed here are not meant to test our model, but rather to
16According to our model, PCM(i) = (p(i)q(i) ￿ wL(i))=p(i)q(i) = 1 ￿ ￿(i), where p(i)q(i) is the value of
shipments and wL(i) is the variable cost. Although in our simple model labor is the only variable cost, we
also net out materials and capital expenditures in our empirical de￿nition of price-cost margins. This avoids
spurious variation in the PCMs due to variation in intermediates-intensity and capital-intensity.
17The US real interest rate has a mean value of 3.75 percent (with a standard deviation of 2.5 percent) over
the period of analysis.
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Figure 5: Openness and PCM Dispersion within SIC-3 Industries
provide a ￿rst indication of how trade has a⁄ected markup dispersion in the US economy.
Table 1 illustrates the main results of our Fixed-E⁄ects within regressions. In column 1,
we regress the standard deviation of the PCMs on the openness ratio only. The openness
coe¢ cient turns out positive and highly signi￿cant, with a t-statistic of 9. In column 2, we add
time dummies to control for spurious results due to correlation of the openness ratio with time
e⁄ects, e.g., the deregulation of the US economy initiated by the Carter Administration in the
mid seventies. Note that in this case the openness coe¢ cient is somewhat reduced, but is still
signi￿cant well beyond conventional levels. In column 3, we add the average price-cost margin.
Although the average PCM is clearly endogenous, including it ensures that the second moment
of its distribution is not mechanically driven by variation in the ￿rst moment. We ￿nd that
the size and signi￿cance of the openness coe¢ cient are una⁄ected. Moreover, the coe¢ cient of
average PCMs is negative and signi￿cant, consistent with the idea that procompetitive forces
may induce a fall of average markups while increasing their dispersion across industries.
22As shown by the empirical literature on the procompetitive e⁄ect of liberalizations, price-
cost margins may also be a⁄ected by industry characteristics. In this respect, by relying on
Fixed-E⁄ects estimates, we implicitly account for time-invariant technological heterogeneity
across industries. However, technology may change over time. Therefore, in columns 4-6
we control for various proxies of industry technology. In particular, we add, sequentially,
total factor productivity (TFP5, from the Bartelsman and Gray￿ s database) to control for
productivity growth, the ratio of non-production to production workers (which proxies for the
skill ratio) to control for skill upgrading, and the capital-output ratio to control for changes
in the capital-intensity. While these controls are generally signi￿cant, they leave the sign and
signi￿cance of the openness coe¢ cient virtually unchanged. In column 7, we also control for
industry size using the log of the real value of shipments as a proxy. The openness coe¢ cient
is slightly reduced but is still signi￿cant beyond the one percent level. Finally, in column 8 we
use a linear trend instead of time dummies and ￿nd no change in the results.
In Table 2, we rerun the same regressions as in Table 1 using a di⁄erent de￿nition of
price-cost margins. In particular, we now treat capital expenditures as a ￿xed cost paid with
operating pro￿ts, and therefore do not subtract these costs from the numerator of PCMs.19
It is reassuring that our main results hold when using this alternative measure of price-cost
margins.
The above results suggest that the positive association between openness and the dispersion
of market power is a robust stylized fact, yet they do not allow us to infer much about the
direction of causality. To address this issue, we next run Fixed-E⁄ects-Instrumental-Variables
regressions for the dispersion of PCMs. A unique advantage of the NBER dataset is that its
long temporal dimension allows to rely on distant lags of our covariates as potentially valid
instruments. To start with, in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 we rerun a baseline Fixed-E⁄ects
regression using lagged instead of current values of openness (see column 2 of Table 1 for a
comparison). In particular, we use, respectively, the 5th and 10th lag of the openness ratio.
Note that in both cases the coe¢ cient of lagged openness is positive, highly signi￿cant and
larger than the coe¢ cient estimated using current openness. This is prima facie evidence of a
possible causal link between openness and the dispersion of market power, and suggests that
19Actually, capital expenditures are in part variable costs and in part ￿xed costs. Netting out capital expen-
ditures may therefore cause underestimation of PCMs, whereas not netting them out may induce overestimation
of PCMs.
23trade liberalization may take some time to fully exert its impact on market structure.
In column 3, we instrument the openness ratio using its lagged values as instruments. The
choice of lag structure is dictated by the standard tests for the quality of the instruments. In
particular, the table reports the P-value of Hansen￿ s J-statistic of overidentifying restrictions
and the F-statistic of excluded instruments in ￿rst stage regressions. Some experimentation
suggests that distant lags (around the 10th lag) provide valid instruments for the openness
ratio. In particular, the high value of the F-statistic suggests that our instruments are strong,
and the J-statistic suggests against their endogeneity. We ￿nd that the openness coe¢ cient
is positive, highly signi￿cant and much larger than in the simple Fixed-E⁄ects regressions. In
column 4, we add all the controls used in previous tables treating them as exogenous. Note
that the results are una⁄ected. Finally, in column 5 we treat all our covariates as endogenous
and use their distant lags as instruments. The F-statistics of excluded instruments are all high
and the Hansen￿ s statistic is insigni￿cant. Again, the coe¢ cient of the openness ratio is large
and very precisely estimated.20
In closing, we brie￿ y comment on the quantitative relevance of our estimates. The average
openness of US industries increased by 37 percentage points in the period of analysis (from
0.087 in the late 50s to 0.459 in the mid 90s). Using a value of 0.1 as a benchmark for the impact
of openness on the standard deviation of PCMs, this implies that trade increased the dispersion
of PCMs by 0.037. This is more than the overall observed increase in the dispersion of PCMs
(around 0.025, see Figure 3). To conclude, our preliminary analysis suggests the impact of
trade on markup dispersion to be large, thereby raising warnings that procompetitive losses
from trade may not be negligible.
4 Concluding Remarks
Competition is imperfect in most sectors of economic activity. By exposing ￿rms to foreign
competition, trade is widely believed to help alleviate the distortions stemming from monopo-
listic pricing. While this argument is certainly appealing and often well-grounded, it neglects
that, in general equilibrium, pricing distortions depend on both the absolute and relative mar-
ket power and that a trade-induced fall in markups may bring unexpected costs when it raises
20Remarkably, the coe¢ cient is virtually identical to the one estimated by OLS on aggregate data in the
Introduction.
24their variance. Our simple model illustrates this point with the highest transparency.
By no mean we want to claim that the dispersion of monopoly power matters more that
the average. Yet, our model shows that disregarding it altogether can lead to potentially large
mistakes in quantifying the welfare e⁄ects of trade and competition policy. As a corollary, policy
makers should recognize that the characteristics of sectors a⁄ected by the ongoing process
of international integration and particularly their competitiveness relative to the rest of the
economy are important factors to correctly foresee the costs and bene￿ts of globalization.
Finally, our ￿rst look at the evidence suggests that trade is systematically associated with
a higher dispersion of markups. This is an interesting and perhaps surprising result, as theory
does not impose much restrictions on how trade may a⁄ect markup dispersion. Investigating
this relationship more in detail and understanding the mechanism generating it seem important
questions for future research.
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= 0 if x = 1:
That is, if there is no asymmetry in markups, a marginal move from autarky to trade in some










x1=(1￿￿) < 0; (25)
because x > 1. Thus, as x grows, the e⁄ect of trade on welfare given by (24) becomes negative.
By inspection of (25), the e⁄ect is greater the higher is ￿. Thus, the negative welfare e⁄ect of
a marginal increase in trade starting from autarky is stronger when x and ￿ are high.























= 0 if x = 1:
That is, if there is no asymmetry in markups, a ￿nal move to free trade in all sectors (in a












because x > 1. Thus, as x grows, the e⁄ect of trade on welfare given by (26) becomes positive.
By inspection of (27), the e⁄ect is greater the higher is ￿. Thus, the positive welfare e⁄ect of
a marginal increase in trade in the vicinity of ￿ = 1 is stronger when x and ￿ are high.
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Table 1. Trade and the Dispersion of Market Power  
Dependent Variable: Standard Deviation of PCMs within 3-Digit SIC Industries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
Openness   0.033***   0.019***   0.019***  0.019***  0.020***  0.020***  0.015***   0.014***
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 
Average PCM  
 
 -0.064*** -0.070*** -0.073*** -0.068*** -0.071***  -0.089***
      (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) 
 
TFP     0.007  0.008  0.009  0.031***  0.033*** 
        (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
 
Skill ratio      -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.025***  -0.021***
      (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
          
Capital output 







          
log of real 






Time trend           0 . 0 0 1 * * *
         (0.000) 
Time 
dummies  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  No 
          
Observations  3648 3648 3648 3648 3648 3648 3648 3648 
SIC-3 
Industries  96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
R-squared 
(within)  0.04 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.14 
Notes: Fixed-Effects (within) estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* = significant at the 1, 5 and 10-
percent levels, respectively. Coefficients of time dummies not reported. Data sources: NBER Productivity Database (by 




















Table 2. Trade and the Dispersion of Market Power ￿ Robustness Check: Capital 
Expenditures Treated as a Fixed Cost  
Dependent Variable: Standard Deviation of PCMs within 3-Digit SIC Industries  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
Openness   0.021***   0.012***   0.011***  0.011***  0.012***  0.013***  0.010**   0.008** 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 
Average PCM       0.038** 0.029*  0.026*  0.033** 0.031** 0.020 
      (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) 
 
TFP     0.010*  0.012**  0.013**  0.026***  0.030*** 
        (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
Skill ratio      -0.047*** -0.046*** -0.039***  -0.033***
      (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
          
Capital output 







          
log of real 






Time trend           0 . 0 0 1 * * *
         (0.000) 
Time 
dummies  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  No 
          
Observations  3744 3744 3648 3648 3648 3648 3648 3648 
SIC-3 
Industries  96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
R-squared 
(within)  0.02 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.12 
Notes: Fixed-Effects (within) estimates with robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,**,* = significant at the 1, 5 and 10-
percent levels, respectively. Coefficients of time dummies not reported. Data sources: NBER Productivity Database (by 



















Table 3. Trade and the Dispersion of Market Power ￿ IV 
 Dependent Variable: Standard Deviation of PCMs within 3-Digit SIC Industries 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 















Openness      0.024*** 
(0.004) 
    0.043*** 
(0.007) 
    0.069*** 
(0.017) 
    0.061*** 
(0.017) 




        -0.104*** 
(0.025) 
      -0.067 
(0.084) 




Skill ratio        -0.026** 
(0.011) 
  -0.096*** 
(0.034) 










Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
P-value Hansen J-
statistic 
    0.42 0.45 0.93 
 
F-statistics of excluded instruments in first stage regressions 
 
Openness      18.83 17.38 13.88 
Average PCM       18.08 
TFP       41.6 
Skill ratio       16.50 
Capital output ratio       9.71 
log of real shipments       78.66 
Observations  3264 2784 2496 2496 2688 
SIC-3 Industries   96   96   96   96   96 
R-squared  0.65 0.66 0.64 0.66 0.59 
Notes: FE = Fixed-Effects (within) estimates; IV = Fixed-Effects (within) Instrumental-Variables estimates. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. ***,**,* = significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. In columns (1) and (2) the openness ratio is lagged 5 
and 10 years, respectively. In columns (3)-(5), the openness ratio is treated as endogenous using its lagged values as instruments. In 
column (5), all RHS variables are treated as endogenous using their lagged values as instruments. Time dummies are always used as 
additional instruments. The middle panel of the table reports the F-statistics for the null that excluded instruments do not enter first stage 
regressions. Data sources: NBER Productivity Database (by Bartelsman and Gray) and NBER Trade Database (by Feenstra).  
 
 
 
 
 